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Abstract 
Female specialization on household work and male specialization on labor-market work is a widely 
observed phenomenon across time and countries. Gender differences regarding characteristics 
(preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized to explain this 
fact. We experimentally investigate work division by true co-habiting couples participating in a newly 
developed specialization task. Efficiency in this task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher 
earnings to the “advantaged” player. We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the advantaged 
position, which correspond to the traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. We 
show that women do not contribute more than men to the household public good whatever the situation. 
This result allows us to rule-out some of the standard explanations of the work division puzzle.  
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1. Introduction 
Labor specialization by men and women is widely observed across time and cultures (Blau and Kahn, 
2007). When living in a couple women, especially mothers, tend to withdraw from the labor market and 
focus on household work, whereas men tend to increase their hours of labor market work (e.g. Alger and 
Cox, 2012). Even in couples where the wife earns more than her husband, we usually still observe equal or 
even more investment by women in household public goods (Brines, 1994; Rizavi and Sofer, 2010; 
Sevilla-Sanz, Gimenez-Nadal, & Fernandez, 2011). This absence of gender neutrality with respect to work 
division is known as the “work division puzzle”. Two factors could cause this phenomenon. Either net-
benefits extracted from domestic work relative to labor market work differ between men and women.1 
Given this ratio of net-benefits, specialization would therefore be a sign of efficient resource allocation by 
the household. Or intrinsic gender norms lead women to contribute to the household public good (e.g. 
Greig and Bohnet, 2009). In this case policies aimed at increasing female labor participation might not be 
effective as long as they cannot overcome these norms. 
Theoretical household models give a framework that details how available time can be transformed into 
individual net-benefits in couples. The main mechanism for this is the household production concept 
(Becker, 1981; Gronau, 1977; Sofer, 1985). Similar to a public good, household services are produced 
using family members’ effort. However while public good dilemmas usually assume that the contribution 
of every member increases efficiency, this is not necessarily the case for household domestic goods. 
Productivity differences across household members might be causing the observed unequal work 
allocation in couples (e.g. Becker, 1981). Productivity at housework compared to labor market wages 
might be greater for women than for men. If women have a comparative advantage at home whereas their 
partners have a comparative advantage on the labor market, the efficient couples would choose a strongly 
gendered work division. In such a case, efficient allocation of resources in the household causes gender 
specialization. When interested in work division in families we therefore have to investigate how spouses 
interact in situations requiring task specialization. 
Investigating the causes of gender specialization in families is naturally constrained by the availability of 
information on relative domestic productivity levels. While productivity on the labor market can be easily 
approximated by observed wage rates, domestic productivity is difficult to measure. One of the rare 
exception is domestic production in agricultural economies. In addition even in cases where productivity 
is measurable, this does not imply that the affected household members are actually aware of these 
differences. The additional impact of social pressure through neighbors, colleagues or family members, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Benefits can be material but might also be related to status or emotions. Benefits also have to be adjusted for either 
material or non-material costs.  
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even harder to control. Social pressure might indeed constitute a significant cost associated with 
deviations from gender norms. We therefore propose an experimental investigation into spouses’ behavior 
in an environment where a household public good can be produced and relative advantages are such that 
efficiency requires specialization. Our ‘specialization game’ will allow us to investigate the counterfactual 
where women earn more from non-public good investment than men, which corresponds to the work 
division puzzle. We can further eliminate the impact of social pressure by allowing for choices in an 
anonymous environment. Tasks requiring specialization, as we propose it, have not yet been 
experimentally studied. Since our specialization game is structured such that efficiency comes at the cost 
of inequality, a strong concern for efficiency is required by the disadvantaged player to make 
contributions to the public good. Family economics assumes such a strong efficiency interest among 
spouses.2  
The empirical evidence confirms that women contribute more to household public goods (for example 
childcare) than men (see Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Thomas, 1990, for developing countries; and 
Lunderg and Pollack, 1997, for the U.K.).  Also women are often considered to be more caring, friendly 
and oriented towards cooperation than men (Balliet et al., 2011). Results from experimental social 
dilemma games among strangers sometimes supports this view and sometimes contradicts it. The reason 
seems to lie in a higher sensitivity to social context by women  (Ledyard, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 
2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Balliet et al., 2011). An important empirical question is, to which degree 
existing gender differences in social situations are shaped by society (through institutions, norms and 
social pressure) and to which degree they are internalized. The psychological costs of social pressure by 
being observed and judged, can have important consequences for behavior (e.g. Hoffman et al. 1994; 
Masclet et al., 2003). At the same time cognitive dissonance, due to not being able to comply with an 
internalized norm, can hurt the self-image and equally influence behaviors (e.g. Bénabou and Tirole, 
2001; Murnighan et al., 2001). The origin of gender differences concerning altruism and cooperation has 
also been related to sociocultural or evolutionary arguments (Balliet et al., 2011; Alger and Cox, 2012). 
The general conclusion is that generalizable gender differences for behavior in social dilemmas are 
unlikely to exist and that an understanding of gender differences requires a separate analysis for different 
types of interactions and situations. Family interactions are both from an evolutionary and sociocultural 
perspective crucial for men and women. Controlled experiments on family interactions suggest so far that 
men care more for efficiency, whereas women tend to care more for equality (Cochard et al, forthcoming; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The existence of efficiency concerns also among unrelated individuals has been suggested by Engelmann and 
Strobel, (2004) and Engelmann and Strobel (2006) and been discussed in Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) and Fehr 
et.al. (2006). 
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Beblo and Beninger, 2012; Kamas and Peston, 2012). Since in many experimental paradigms efficiency 
and equality are correlated, distinguishing these two motives requires a specific approach. 
We study spouses’ behavior in a novel specialization task and compare behavior to a situation involving a 
standard voluntary contribution mechanism (e.g. Isaac and Walker, 1988). In both cases investment in the 
private good contributes to an increase in own payoff whereas investment in the public good leads to the 
production of a good equally distributed among spouses. The specialization task creates an asymmetric 
situation in which returns from the private good are higher for one of the spouses compared to his/her 
partner.3 The participant that will in the following be called “the advantaged player” will generate larger 
returns from private investment than from public good investment. If gender differences concerning public 
good contribution are internalized, we expect behavior in the experiment to reflect this and women to 
invest more in the public good, regardless of private returns. If gender differences do not concern public 
good contributions in general, but are rather related to efficiency and equality concerns, our design allows 
us to disentangle these. If however real world gender differences are mainly caused by external factors 
(differences in payoffs or social pressure), we expect that men and women will react in the same way to 
being in either the advantaged or disadvantaged position.4  
Previous experimental studies on couples’ behavior in social dilemmas have rejected the idea that 
maximal efficiency is achieved (Cochard et al., forthcoming; Iversen et al., 2011; Ashraf, 2009; Mani, 
2008). Nevertheless relatively high efficiency levels are observed and a significant proportion of couples 
maximizes efficiency. However, by definition, social dilemmas are structured such that contribution to the 
public good implies maximization of efficiency. Our specialization game presents a situation where for the 
“advantaged” spouse, private investment is maximizing own payoffs but also efficient for the household. 
Thus our design eliminates the dilemma nature for the advantaged spouse if he aims at own payoff 
maximization and efficiency. However if spouses care at the same time for efficiency and for equality of 
earnings from the game, this creates a new sort of dilemma. The advantaged player has to trade-off 
maximizing household income or equalizing private payoffs for both partners. As previously discussed, 
spouses have been observed to show a concern for equality of earnings and might thus face this type of 
dilemma. 
Our results show that couples react to inequalities concerning private returns in the expected way: namely 
the advantaged spouse (i.e. the one with higher private returns) reduces his/her investment in the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Specialization in couples has also been studied by Goerges (2015) however for a task where spouses jointly decide 
whether to specialize or not and who of the two partners should take the role of the ‘advantaged’ player. 
4 In other domains (Gneezy et al, 2009) it has been shown that gender differences can be inverted given different 
institutions. Specifically it was observed that the generally believed greater competitiveness of men disappears in a 
matriarchic culture.  
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good and increases his investment in the private good. We further observe that the inequality concerning 
private returns causes symmetric behavior dependent on whether either the man or the woman has a 
higher private return. Our results thus support in a lab setting the theoretical assumption that labor 
specialization by spouses is mainly driven by differences in net-benefits from labor market activity, and 
are not a result of gender specific preferences concerning public good contributions. We further observe a 
tendency for higher efficiency among men and for more equality among women. We test the robustness of 
our results by comparing behavior in an abstract task where contributions are defined by the allocation of 
points and a time allocation task, where contributions depend on actual time invested. Time allocation 
might provide a more intuitive context to the dilemma (e.g. Loomes, 1999) and thus increases the external 
validity of our results. Our results concerning gender differences are not affected by this framing however 
we observe overall higher efficiency levels under the time allocation framing. 
	  
2. Task and predictions: 
To study the impact of comparative advantages for men or women we will introduce a “specialization 
task”. In this two-player game, efficiency is reached when only one of the two players (the 
“disadvantaged” player) contributes his entire endowment to a public good. Since public good production 
is equally distributed on both players, efficiency leads to inequality in earnings. As a baseline we will use 
a standard two-person public good game that we will describe first. 
2.1. Baseline: the symmetric public good game 
In the baseline symmetric public good game spouses receive an initial endowment of 20 units and are 
asked to decide concerning its allocation on either a private or public account. Each unit invested in the 
public account returns 1.2 as much as one unit invested in the private account. Returns from the public 
account are equally split across the two spouses. Earnings of a player investing cs (i.e. contribution by self) 
in the public good where the partner contributes cp to the public good are calculated as follows5: 
 ys = 10 (20 – cs) + 6 (cs + cp) (1) 
We present part of the game matrix in Figure 1.  
As usual in these kinds of dilemmas, efficiency would be reached if players chose to cooperate, namely 
contributing all their endowment to the public good (cs=20; cp=20). The Nash-equilibrium predicts mutual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We present here the actual point earnings also used in the experiment. To avoid calculations with fractions, each 
unit invested in the private account returns 10 experimental units, and each unit invested in the public good returns 6 
experimental units to each of the two spouses. 
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defection for two selfish individuals (cs=0; cp=0) in a one-shot interaction and this corresponds to the 
lowest earnings for both players. Since even strangers present other-regarding preferences in these types 
of games, we expect this phenomenon to be even stronger for couples.6 Indeed the maximization of joint 
earnings (implying that both spouses contribute to the public good) occurs more frequently in couples than 
when strangers play together (Cochard et al., forthcoming). In the case of our symmetric game, 
predictions of individual behavior dependent on three extreme cases of social preferences are summarized 
in Table 1. An own-payoff maximizing agent (pure selfishness) would contribute nothing to the public 
good (cs = 0). A player who aims at maximizing spouse’s payoff (extreme altruism) would do the opposite 
(cs = 20). Finally, a purely inequality averse agent would always act as he believes his/her partner to do in 
order to minimize the difference in earnings. Denoting self-beliefs about the partner’s contribution: Bcp, 
he simply contributes: cs = Bcp. 
2.2 Specialization game 
The specialization game reflects the puzzle that occurs when a couple makes a work division choice. For 
one player, the “advantaged” one, the choice of not investing in the public good is efficient, the individual 
interest and the couples interest are thus aligned. This could be viewed as the choice of specializing in 
labor market work instead of contributing to household production when having a higher labor market 
wage rate.7 On the contrary, the “disadvantaged” player will have to make a choice that leads to a dilemma 
between his/her self-interest and the couple’s interest. This corresponds to the choice of specialization in 
household work for the partner who has lower labor market earnings. In this case efficiency and equality 
are in conflict. The efficient solution in the specialization game is also the most unequal one. 
Concretely, as in the baseline game, each individual is endowed with 20 units that have to be allocated 
between a private and a public account. Earnings from the public account are the same as in the case 
discussed above. However, earnings from the private account are not the same for both partners. 
Specifically one of the two players is advantaged and earns from his private account 1.3 times more than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In a preceding article, we discuss how model predictions are affected when participants in the experiment are true 
couples. Efficiency is reached more easily because of two phenomena: a strong aversion to payoff inequality within 
the couple and the presence of a micro-norm of sharing which contaminates the way individual payoffs are 
transformed into individual welfare. Because couples have interactions outside of the laboratory (essentially 
consumption sharing habits) the control of individual payoffs remains imperfect and this generates a complexity in 
the analysis that we chose not to integrate in this article. The interested reader can refer to Cochard et al. 
(forthcoming) and consider that an income-pooling micro-norm would generate a preference for efficiency during 
the experiment. 
7 In real life, such specialization could also be due to lower household productivity or to social pressure inflicting 
additional costs. 
7	  
	  
the other player. Denoting cs (resp. cp), the contribution by self (resp. partner) to the public account, 
individual earnings are computed as follows: 
𝑦!!"#!$%!&'"             = 13   20 −   𝑐! +   6   𝑐! + 𝑐!  𝑦!!"#$!%$&'$()!     = 10   20 −   𝑐! +   6   𝑐! + 𝑐!  (2) 
The game matrix is shown in Figure 2 and predictions according to different kinds of social preferences 
are presented in Table 1. 
In the asymmetric case, an advantaged player that aims at maximizing the joint earnings of the couple (i.e. 
pure efficiency seeking) should invest all of his units in his private account (cs=0). A disadvantaged 
partner that aims at maximizing joint earnings of the couple should still invest all units in the public 
account (cs=20). In contrast, an own payoff maximizing agent will never contribute to the public good 
(cs=0). A player who aims at maximizing his spouse’s payoff would fully contribute (cs=20).  
A pure inequality averse agent will act in a way to minimize the difference in earnings (i.e. min |ys - yp|), 
thus acting in function of his/her beliefs of the partner’s action, denoted Bcp. The advantaged spouse will 
in this case choose: 
 𝑐! = !"!" +   !"!"   𝓑𝑐! (3) 
Thus an advantaged individual who is intra-household income inequality adverse contributes despite this 
solution being not efficient. A purely inequality adverse, disadvantaged spouse will choose: 
𝑐! = −6 + !"!"   𝓑𝑐!        𝑖𝑓  𝓑𝑐! >    !"!"0                                                    𝑖𝑓    𝓑𝑐! ≤    !"!"   (4) 
In other words: such a player will not contribute to the public good if he believes his partner’s contribution 
will be too small (i.e. lower than 5). 
We can imagine linear combinations of any combination of these four extreme strategies (selfish, altruist, 
efficiency seeker and inequality averse). In this case we might want to differentiate between preferences 
that give relative stronger weight to self (i.e. ys ) of the form: 𝑈! = 𝛼  𝑦! +   𝛽   𝑦! + 𝑦! − 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 𝑦! − 𝑦!     (5) 
and preferences that give relatively stronger weight to the other (i.e. yp ) of the form:  
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𝑈! = 𝛾  𝑦! +   𝛿   𝑦! + 𝑦! − 1 − 𝛾 − 𝛿 𝑦! − 𝑦!    (6) 
with 0 ≤ 𝛼,𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿   ≤ 1, where 𝛼 and 𝛾 indicate the weight of own (equation 5) and partners (equation 6) 
earnings, respectively. And where 𝛽  and 𝛿  indicate the additional weight of joint earnings.  
While it is difficult to distinguish between preference for equality and efficiency in general social dilemma 
games, our specialization task allows us to do so. Figure 3 illustrates strategies given an individual’s 
beliefs about his partner’s behavior for a player in either an advantaged or disadvantaged position. The 
shaded area in the left panel indicates belief-choice combinations that are consistent with a function of the 
form 𝑈! (i.e. some selfish concern). The shaded area in the right panel indicates combinations consistent 
with a function of type 𝑈! (i.e. some altruism concern). To investigate the type of preferences in couples 
we also elicit beliefs among spouses about their partners’ actions.  
To investigate the symmetry and robustness of our results we will consider a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 design. Two of 
these treatment variations are on a between subject level and will be described first. The others are on an 
in-subject level and will be discussed afterwards. 
On a between subject level we will compare treatments where either the man or the woman is advantaged. 
This will allow us to compare a situation where men have a comparative advantage with the 
counterfactual where women have the comparative advantage concerning the private good. We will 
further compare behavior in a setting where from the beginning it was clear that decisions and earnings 
would remain anonymous and not be revealed to partners, with a situation where from the beginning 
spouses knew that their actions and earnings would at the end of the experiment be revealed to their 
partner. This treatment will serve us as control concerning the impact of anonymity on free riding. 
Treatments concerning who is advantaged (M or W) and whether earnings will be public or private are 
conducted in a between subject design (see Table 2). 
In an in-subject design we further compare the baseline game with the specialization game described 
above. We observe three different framings of these games to control for their abstraction level. In the 
baseline treatment (Time), spouses decide how to allocate 5 minutes of time between two abstract work 
tasks (A and B), one leading to production of the private and the other of the public good. To observe the 
robustness of these results we compare them to an abstract treatment (Abstract), where spouses are asked 
to invest tokens in either a project A or B. A second control (Effort) investigates whether requiring effort 
in addition to time allocation alters results. 
3. Experimental protocol 
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The experiment was conducted in June 2010 in the laboratory of experimental economics at the Toulouse 
School of Economics. Overall 86 couples participated in the experiment. The experiment was 
computerized and the interface was programmed in Visual Basic. Participants were recruited by 
newspaper reports about the ongoing study, flyers and information provided on a website. The recruitment 
information specified that heterosexual couples, more than 20 years old were invited to participate in a 
study of economic decisions by couples. Couples were required to live together for at least one year (but 
did not need to be married) and invited to sign up jointly for one two-hour session. The announcements 
further specified that each couple would earn, dependent on its decisions and on chance, an amount 
between 60 and 120 Euros for participation. 
Mean age by men and women was 35 and 36 years, respectively. Partners had been living together for an 
average of 9 years, 59% of our participating couples were married or under civil union (PACS) and 40% 
had at least one child living in their household. Summary statistics can be found in Table 3. 
In total 18 sessions were conducted with at least 3 and at most 6 couples present. Great care was taken to 
explain each part of the instructions as simple as possible and screens were presented in a graphically 
intuitive way (see Appendices A and B). 
Upon arrival participants were invited to a reception room that provided some refreshments and journals. 
When all couples had arrived, we announced that the study was about to begin and that participants should 
not communicate in the lab. Couples then entered the lab and were seated in cubicles. Men and women 
were seated in the front rows and the back rows, respectively. This ensured that partners could not 
communicate or observe each other during the study. 
Couples participated in four experimental parts and a questionnaire part. The timeline of the different parts 
of the study is described in Table 4. Instructions to the different parts of the experiment were always read 
aloud. Participants were actively encouraged to ask questions if something was not clear to them. After 
instructions were read, a short summary of the instructions was displayed on screen and participants had to 
answer a short control question to test their understanding. When participants had finished reading the 
summary, and correctly answered the control question, they were invited to enter their decision on screen. 
Initial instructions informed participants that they were about to participate in a study on decision making 
in which they have to take a number of decisions. It was explained that the study would consist of a 
number of separate parts, each part consisting of one or more decisions to be taken. Earnings from the 
experiment were calculated in an experimental currency: Francs Toulousains (FT), which were exchanged 
10	  
	  
to euro at the end of the session (20 FT = 1 euro). It was stressed that decisions were individual, private 
and anonymous with respect to the experimenters and to other couples.  
Depending on treatment, subjects were further informed about their payoff being revealed (treatment 
public) to their partner at the end of the session or that payoffs would remain private information and not 
be revealed to their partner (treatment private). Half of the participants were further in a treatment 
favoring men (M), the other were in a treatment favoring women (W). In the initial instructions it was 
made clear that the “advantaged” participants would throughout the experiment have higher earning 
possibilities.  
The experiment consisted of three parts. In each of the three parts couples were presented with the 
decision problems described above concerning investment in either a public or private account. In the first 
part investment was represented in an abstract way using points that could be allocated to either account, 
denoted A and B to participants.  All participants had 20 points at their disposal.  In parts two and three 
investment was represented in a more concrete way using a time period of 5 minutes (20 intervals of 15 
seconds) during which participants worked on a task associated with either account.  
In each part the baseline and specialization task were presented. Investment in the private account lead to 
private earnings of the individual, investment in the public account lead to the production of a public good 
that was equally redistributed among the partners. In the baseline game each point / time interval invested 
in the private account earned 10 experimental currency units, and each point / time interval invested in the 
public account returned 6 experimental currency units to each partner. In the specialization game one of 
the two partners earned for each point / time interval invested in the private account 13 experimental 
currency units (i.e. the 'advantaged' player) while the other received only 10 experimental currency units. 
Earnings from the public account were the same as in the baseline game. The advantaged player was in all 
three parts either the man or the woman in the couple. 
Parts two and three consisted each of an allocation of work time on two tasks. The difference between the 
two parts consisted in the fact that in part two a leisure task was available. This leisure task consisted in 
the option to surf the Internet. Inactivity in the effort tasks was considered as leisure and lead 
automatically to a web-browser allowing for Internet access.  
The order of the three parts was always the same. The part including leisure was presented before the part 
without leisure to make participants as unsuspicious as possible about the presence of the leisure option. 
Specifically we wanted to ensure that participants felt that this environment was natural and that they 
would not feel inhibited to use the opportunity for leisure. In part three no leisure option was available, 
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and therefore decisions by spouses only concerned the allocation of 5 minutes of time between the two 
options without imposing effort. 
Concretely, in parts two and three, both tasks were identical and, as before, denoted as A and B. They both 
consisted of copying phone numbers from a list but corresponded to either a public or a private investment 
with different pay-offs for the individual and the couple. Payment for both tasks was by time spent on the 
task and not by quantity nor quality of the work done. By doing so we exclude productivity differences 
due to different ability levels. Specifically participants were paid by interval of 15 seconds, for a total 
endowment of 5 minutes (i.e. 20 x 15 seconds = 300 seconds). Participants could switch back and forth 
between tasks and payment was calculated by the total amount of time spend on either task. The task was 
rather easy and participants had a 3 minutes time interval to familiarize themselves with the task and the 
computer interface that allowed switching between the different options.  
In part three payment was not dependent on effort (having actually worked and typed numbers) but solely 
on the time the participant chose to spend on the computer interface corresponding to either task. The 
whole time endowment was therefore allocated between the public or private account. In part two this was 
not necessarily the case: specifically inactivity was considered as leisure and therefore not counted in 
either account.8 While working, participants could see in real-time how much time they had left and how 
much time they had already spent on the two tasks.  
Final earnings were determined by one randomly selected game out of each part.9 Spouses could therefore 
not deduce from earnings the actions of their partner. In the treatment with common knowledge 
concerning earnings, partners knew from the beginning that their earnings and actions would be made 
known to their partner at the end. In the treatment with private information about earnings each player was 
privately informed about his/her earnings. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Choices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 After 15 seconds without entering a correct number, participants received a visual warning. After another 15 
seconds without typing they were sent to the leisure task (in part three, there was only a visual warning but no 
sanction in the absence of typing). 
9 Before final payout participants entered a chat phase (Part 5, see Table 4). This phase allows us to observe possible 
transfers between partners after finishing the experiment. Specifically partners were given the option to decide to 
allocate part of their earnings to a common envelope if desired. Independent of their decision each participant 
received a private envelope, the content of which was not revealed to the partner. 
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We first focus on the sustainability of task specialization in the couple during the experiment. We start our 
analysis with observations from treatments involving time allocation (Time), see Figure 4. Average 
contributions to the public good in the baseline public good situation are 17.1 (5.7)10. As expected, 
contributions are not different for advantaged or disadvantaged players (Mann Whitney by advantage,11,12 
women: p = 0.938, men: p = 0.552). In the specialization game players with low returns from the private 
good invest about 16.7 (6.6) of their available resources in the public good. By contrast advantaged 
players that have higher returns from their private good invest only about 4.4 (6.9) of their resources in the 
public good (see Figure 5 for individual distributions). As efficiency requires that the advantaged spouse 
does not contribute, this implies that in both games spouses reach a mean efficiency level13 of about 80%. 
Contributions are not different for advantaged or disadvantaged players (Mann Whitney by advantage, 
women: p = 0.553, men: p = 0.193). On a couple level more than 75% of couples have a mean efficiency 
level equal or above 70% (see Figure 6 for the distributions). The difference concerning efficiency in the 
baseline and specialization game is not significant (Sign test for matched pairs,14 p = 1.000). Our first 
result is therefore the following: 
Result 1: Participants react to the asymmetry in returns from the private good. Advantaged players 
reduce their investment in the public good and increase their investment in the private good. As a result 
efficiency is at the same level in the baseline game and the specialization game. 
This result is surprising because, on average, the outcome therefore represents much higher intra-
household earnings inequality in the specialization game than in the baseline. It has been shown that 
partners in a dictator game type allocation task tend to favor inefficient solutions for the couple when 
confronted with high levels of intra-household income inequality (Beblo et al., 2015). The acceptance of 
inequalities by spouses in this case, provides however support to the idea that implicit mechanism exist on 
the household level that allow for a redistribution of earnings. Such mechanism could be the presence of a 
micro-norm of sharing (Cochard et al., forthcoming). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
11 Unless otherwise stated, tests are two-sided and we use a 5% threshold of significance to consider that the null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
12 It is not possible to treat all data (n = 172) as independent observations as each spouse’s decision is clearly not 
independent from his/her partner’s decision. Thus, we carry out tests on each sex separately (n = 86 observations for 
each). 
13 Efficiency for disadvantaged players is computed as their investment divided by 20. For advantaged players, 
efficiency equals (20 – their investment) / 20. The couple’s efficiency rate is simply the mean efficiency rate of the 
spouses. 
14 The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is preferable whenever the distribution of the differences is symmetric around the 
median, since it takes into account the magnitude of the differences. However, the assumption of symmetry appears 
sometimes to be strong in our case, so that we focus primarily on the Sign test, which does not require symmetry. We 
shall nevertheless warn the reader if the Wilcoxon test gives a different conclusion. 
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We next question the gender neutrality of result 1. At first glance, Figure 4 suggests that there might be a 
gender difference in contribution to the public good. These apparent gender effects are in fact not 
significant (Mann-Whitney, advantaged spouses: p = 0.329, disadvantaged spouses: p = 0.112). This 
shows that men and women do not react differently to the fact of being in either the advantaged or 
disadvantaged position. Thus contrary to theories that ascribe specialization to internalized norms, we 
observe no evidence of women investing more in the public good than men. Both men and women 
contribute around 80% of their resources to the public good when in the disadvantaged position, and 
around 20% when in the advantaged position. 
Result 2: In the specialization game, men and women react in the same way to being in either the 
advantaged or disadvantaged position. We observe no gender differences concerning investment in the 
public good. 
Overall, these results are robust to the possibility of real leisure (treatment Effort). Contribution of time 
units in treatments Time and Effort is not significantly different (see Table 5 for descriptive statistics and 
Table 6 for tests). Indeed actual observed effort was high in treatment Time, even though only time 
intervals were remunerated. Across treatments men and women typed approximately eight ten-digit phone 
numbers per minute (i.e. about 80 keystrokes per minute). This seems close to the typing speed of non-
trained two-finger typists (Brown, 1988). This suggests that subjects felt as much compelled to provide an 
effort in treatment Time than in treatment Effort, although no sanction actually existed in the former.  In 
addition, subjects did not take much leisure in treatment Effort, which would have decreased efficiency 
with respect to treatment Time (the average time of leisure is of 3.13 seconds in the Baseline game, and of 
3.49 seconds in the specialization game). As contributions do not differ much across the Time and Effort 
treatments, Result 1 and 2 are globally confirmed for the latter treatment. 
Turning to the Abstract treatment, we note that overall efficiency levels are affected. We note that 
efficiency levels tend to be slightly higher in the Time treatments compared to the Abstract treatments 
(Table 5). This difference is significant at p < 0.05 in the symmetric public good tasks and in the 
specialization task for disadvantaged subjects (Table 6). We therefore see more efficient outcomes when 
decisions are framed in a more naturalistic and involving way. Time investment might have focused 
participants on the trade off between the two tasks by forcing them to switch during the 5 minutes time 
interval from one task to the other. Abstract investment on the other hand might be more abstract and give 
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rise to some sort of aversion of zero investment in one of the two tasks.15 Finally, it should be noticed that 
despite these differences, Result 1 and Result 2 are also verified for the Abstract treatment. 
We finally observe that behavior is robust to earnings being private or public (see Table 5). Contributions 
to the public good (in both the public good game and the specialization game) are on average slightly 
higher when earnings are public information. However this effect is very small and not significant.  The 
fact that contributions and not efficiency is higher under public information however lends further support 
to the hypothesis that efficiency loss is not due to free riding but to other-regarding preferences, e.g. for 
equality of payouts. This interpretation would be also in line with earlier findings that indicate a concern 
for equality among spouses (Beblo et al., 2012). 
 
4.2. Preferences 
Choices lead in the specialization task as well as in the baseline, to efficiency levels of around 80%. We 
might however wonder whether this can be ascribed to preferences for efficiency or to preferences for 
equality given optimistic beliefs about the partner. Given that our results are qualitatively neither altered 
by the availability of information nor by the framing of investment, we will in the following concentrate 
on results from the Time treatment to investigate the relationship between beliefs and actions. The 
following results also hold when results from either of the other treatments are used. 
Figure 5 confirms that a large proportion of participants (almost 70%) act in a fully efficiency maximizing 
way. About 20% of participants (i.e. 33 individuals) split their investment between the two investment 
options. We will use beliefs to investigate if these choices can be interpreted as stemming from inequality 
aversion. Beliefs are plotted against own actions for advantaged and disadvantaged players in Figure 7. 
The top panel shows results from the baseline task. Indeed we see that a large proportion of observations 
falls close to the 45° line. In this task, 64% contributed 20 and declared that they believed that their 
partner contributed 20.  However since the baseline game is symmetric, this might be an indication of 
concerns for efficiency, for equality or alternatively be the result of a social projection bias (e.g. Glaeser et 
al, 2000; Sapienza et al., 2013). The projection bias is the belief that people close to us will act like us. 
The specialization task requires a bit more cognitive effort by the participant to understand the incentive 
situation of their partner. Our results (Figure 7, bottom panel) confirm that participants do not simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Note that our time allocation paradigm cannot be necessarily compared to experiments using real-effort tasks to 
influence fairness norms (e.g. Kroll et al., 2007). While real-effort tasks introduce some property right framing to 
individual earnings, time allocation does not necessarily require effort and represents just another way to state 
preferences for the allocation of investment. 
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project their own actions on their beliefs about their partner. A large proportion of advantaged participants 
(42 out of 86) and disadvantaged participants (50 out of 86) reports beliefs that in combination with their 
own choice lead to maximal efficiency and that are largely asymmetric in actions. 
The density distribution plots in Figure 7 also allow us a comparison with the characterization of 
preferences from Figure 3. We notice that the large majority of observations for advantaged players, 
83.7%, fall in the area compatible with functions of type 𝑈! (combination of motives with some selfish 
concern). While the large proportion of observation for disadvantaged players, 87.2%, falls in the area that 
is consistent with a function of type 𝑈! (combination of motives with some altruistic concern). Since the 
role of advantaged player was randomly allocated and equally distributed over the two sexes, it seems 
unrealistic to assume that advantaged players are more selfish while disadvantaged players more altruistic. 
The more likely interpretation is that for both types of players a mix of efficiency and equality concerns 
influence behavior. This is in line with earlier results that observe a trade-of between efficiency and 
equality in couples.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper presents experimental results concerning work division choices made by true couples. We 
observe behavior in a specialization task and compare choices to a baseline public good task. The 
specialization task is meant to simulate the dilemma between family and work life experienced by many 
couples. In addition, it allows us to study the counterfactual where men are in a disadvantaged position 
concerning their private earnings which occurs in some non-traditional “power couples” (Bloemen and 
Stancanelli, forthcoming). The efficient outcome is such that one member will increase his private 
earnings from choosing the efficient option (i.e. specializes into labor market work), whereas the other 
sacrifices private earnings in order to invest in the household public good (i.e. specializes into household 
work). We test the robustness of our results given different framings of the investment task (time 
allocation or abstract) and whether individual earnings are private or public within the couple.  
Couples react in the expected way in the specialization task. Their behavior is largely compatible with the 
predictions. Efficiency levels are in the baseline and in the specialization task at about 80%. In particular, 
advantaged players reduce their contribution to the public good and disadvantaged players maintain their 
contributions largely unchanged. From comparing the public and private treatment, we did not find 
evidence of behavior being driven by selfish opportunistic concerns. The baseline versus specialization 
treatment did not show a change in efficiency despite the increase of inequality at the household level in 
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the specialization game. This striking result is compatible with the existence of an intrinsic coordination 
mechanism among couples unrelated to inequality in earnings. An income-pooling micro-norm could play 
such a role (see Beblo and Beninger, 2012; Cochard et al., forthcoming). Besides this main result, some 
spouses also show clear concerns for equality in the experiment. Framing the task in abstract terms leads 
to a slight but significant loss in overall efficiency. The more naturalistic time allocation task therefore 
leads to higher overall earnings for the couple. Time allocation might be seen as a closer resemblance of 
actual investment decisions in couples and thus lends better external validity to our results. 
We observe no significant gender differences. Men and women react almost the same to being in either 
the advantaged or disadvantaged position in the specialization task. Hence, our results support in an 
abstract laboratory setting the theoretical assumption that labor specialization by spouses is driven by 
differences in net-benefits from labor market activity. Contrary to real-life, the work-division puzzle does 
not appear in the experiment: when the woman out-earns her spouse (“power” couples) she generally 
continues to bear the largest part of domestic work. Both the value that men and women attribute to the 
specific service produced at home (e.g. education of a child) and social pressure with respect to gender 
norms could matter in the persistence of nowadays work division among couples. Our experiment shows 
however, that women do not have a higher preference for investing in the public good in a household.   
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Tables and Figures 
	  
FIGURE 1: Pay-off matrix baseline game.  
 
     Partner 
 
Self 
cp = 0 cp = 1 … cp = 19 cp = 20 
cs = 0 
400 200 
200 0 
402 196 
206 10 
… 
438 124 
314 90 
440 120 
320 100 
cs = 1 
402 206 
196 10 
404 202 
202 0 
… 
440 130 
310 80 
442 126 
316 90 
… … … … … … 
cs = 19 
438 314 
124 90 
440 310 
130 80 
… 
476 238 
238 0 
478 244 
234 10 
cs = 20 
440 320 
120 100 
442 316 
126 90 
… 
478 244 
234 10 
480 240 
240 0 
 
Upper left numbers indicate household payoff (maximized by pure efficiency seeking, best responses of 
self marked in blue). Lower right numbers indicate the absolute difference in payoffs (minimized by pure 
inequality aversion, best responses marked in red).  
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FIGURE 2: Pay-off matrix, specialization task (when self is advantaged) 
     Partner 
 
Self	  
cp = 0 cp = 1	   cp = 2	   cp = 3	   cp = 4	   cp = 5	   cp = 6	   cp = 7	   ... cp = 19	   cp = 20	  
cs = 0 
460 200 462 196 464 192 466 188 468 184 470 180 472 176 474 172 
... 
498 124 500 120 
260 60 266 70 272 80 278 90 284 100 290 110 296 120 302 130 374 250 380 260 
cs = 1	  
459 206 461 202 463 198 465 194 467 190 469 186 471 182 473 178 
... 
497 130 499 126 
253 47 259 57 265 67 271 77 277 87 283 97 289 107 295 117 367 237 373 247 
cs = 2	  
458 212 460 208 462 204 464 200 466 196 468 192 470 188 472 184 
... 
496 136 498 132 
246 34 252 44 258 54 264 64 270 74 276 84 282 94 288 104 360 224 366 234 
cs = 3	  
457 218 459 214 461 210 463 206 465 202 467 198 469 194 471 190 
... 
495 142 497 138 
239 21 245 31 251 41 257 51 263 61 269 71 275 81 281 91 353 211 359 221 
cs = 4	  
456 224 458 220 460 216 462 212 464 208 466 204 468 200 470 196 
... 
494 148 496 144 
232 8 238 18 244 28 250 38 256 48 262 58 268 68 274 78 346 198 352 208 
cs = 5	  
455 230 457 226 459 222 461 218 463 214 465 210 467 206 469 202 
... 
493 154 495 150 
225 5 231 5 237 15 243 25 249 35 255 45 261 55 267 65 339 185 345 195 
cs = 6	  
454 236 456 232 458 228 460 224 462 220 464 216 466 212 468 208 
... 
492 160 494 156 
218 18 224 8 230 2 236 12 242 22 248 32 254 42 260 52 332 172 338 182 
cs = 7	  
453 242 455 238 457 234 459 230 461 226 463 222 465 218 467 214 
... 
491 166 493 162 
211 31 217 21 223 11 229 1 235 9 241 19 247 29 253 39 325 159 331 169 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
cs = 19	  
441 314 443 310 445 306 447 302 449 298 451 294 453 290 455 286 
... 
479 238 481 234 
127 187 133 177 139 167 145 157 151 147 157 137 163 127 169 117 241 3 247 13 
cs = 20	  
440 320 442 316 444 312 446 308 448 304 450 300 452 296 454 292 
... 
478 244 480 240 
120 200 126 190 132 180 138 170 144 160 150 150 156 140 162 130 234 10 240 0 
Upper left numbers indicate the household payoff (maximized by pure efficiency seeking, best responses 
marked in blue). Lower right numbers indicate the absolute difference in payoffs (minimized by pure 
inequality aversion, best responses marked in red). 
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FIGURE 3: Illustration of strategies given beliefs for linear combinations of the different preferences. 
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FIGURE 4: Contributions to public good by gender in baseline and specialization task.  
 
Results correspond to the time treatment (part 3 of the experiment). Note that in baseline no player was 
advantaged but that nevertheless one of the two players knew that he would be advantaged throughout the 
experiment. 
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FIGURE 5: Histogram of time investment by advantaged and disadvantaged players in specialization task 
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FIGURE 6: Distribution of mean efficiency reached by couples in baseline and specialization task. 
	  
	  
Note: Efficiency for disadvantaged players is computed as their investment divided by 20. For advantaged players, 
efficiency equals (20 – their investment) / 20. The couple’s efficiency rate is simply the mean efficiency rate of the 
spouses. 
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FIGURE 7: Actions versus beliefs concerning partners’ actions for advantaged and disadvantaged 
players (treatment Time). 
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TABLE 1: Predictions dependent on preferences	  
 
	   selfishness 
max ys 
altruism 
max yp 
efficiency seeking 
max (ys + yp) 
inequality aversion 
min |ys-yp| 
Baseline task     
	   cs = 0	   cs = 20	   cs = 20	   cs = Bcp	  
Specialization task 
If advantaged:	   cs = 0	   cs = 20	   cs = 0	   cs = 60/13 + (10/13)Bcp	  
If disadvantaged:	   cs = 0	   cs = 20	   cs = 20	           -6 + (13/10)Bcp if Bcp > 60/13 
cs = 
         0                          if Bcp ≤ 60/13	  
ys denotes the pay-off for self, yp partner’s pay-off and Bcp the belief concerning spouse’s contribution. 
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TABLE 2: Overview of between subject treatments 
 
 
Public  
final earnings public 
information in couple  
Private  
final earnings private 
information in couple 
 
M  
men favored 
11 couples 
(sessions 12, 19) 
32 couples 
(sessions 6, 8, 10, 14, 16, 20) 
43 couples 
W 
women favored 
11 couples 
(sessions 13, 21) 
32 couples 
(sessions 9, 11, 15, 17, 18, 22) 
43 couples 
 
 
22 couples 64 couples 86 couples 
Note: Other sessions were carried out but due to software problems results are not reported here. 
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TABLE 3: Socio-demographic variables of participants (86 couples) 
 
Household variables: Mean (std dev)    
Married (dummy) 0.42 0.49    
Civil contract (dummy) 0.17 0.38    
Years as couple 9.45 10.82    
Children living in household 
(dummy) 0.4 0.49    
Joint account (dummy) 0.59 0.49    
Individual variables: Women (std dev) Men (std dev) Correlation 
Age 34.69 11.01 36.26 11.19 0.93 
Employed (dummy) 0.69 0.47 0.70 0.46 0.37 
If employed: hours worked per week 23.83 17.16 25.12 18.26 0.27 
Individual monthly net income 1429.18 634.01 1706.27 671.00 0.16 
Lived in couple before (dummy) 0.35 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.21 
Individual bank account (dummy) 0.85 0.36 0.74 0.44 0.66 
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TABLE 4:	  Timeline	  of	  experimental	  sessions	   	  
Welcome and general instructions 
 
Part 1: Abstract  
   situation 1. Baseline:	  	  	   	   i) action, ii) beliefs 
   situation 2. Specialization task: 	   i) action, ii) beliefs 
 
Familiarization with time allocation task 
 
Part 2: Effort 
   situation 1: Baseline: 	  	   	   i) action, ii) beliefs 
   situation 2: Specialization task: 	   i) action, ii) beliefs 
 
Part 3: Time 
   situation 1:  Baseline: 	   	   i) action, ii) beliefs 
   situation 2:  Specialization task: 	   i) action, ii) beliefs 
 
Part 4: Individual decision task(*) 
   i) actions, ii) beliefs partner, iii) beliefs population 
 
Part 5: Chat phase in couple  
 
Socio-demographic questionnaire  
 
Payout (private or public) and good bye 
   
         (*) Part 4 is not used in this paper. 
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TABLE 5: Average investment levels (out of 20 units) in public good across all treatments  
 
Baseline: 
  Advantaged player: 
 Public 
(n=22) 
Private 
(n=64) 
All 
(n=86) 
Abstract 16.68 15.45 15.77 
Effort 16.64 16.23 16.34 
Time 17.82 16.75 17.02 
All framings 17.05 16.15 16.38 
 Disadvantaged player: 
 Public 
(n=22) 
Private 
(n=64) 
All 
(n=86) 
Abstract 16.82 15.30 15.69 
Effort 17.73 16.55 16.85 
Time 17.95 16.88 17.15 
All framings 17.50 16.24 16.56 
 
Specialization task:  
 Advantaged player: 
 Public 
(n=22) 
Private 
(n=64) 
All 
(n=86) 
Abstract 4.55 5.63 5.35 
Effort 5.09 3.34 3.79 
Time 4.73 4.23 4.36 
All framings 4.79 4.40 4.50 
 Disadvantaged player: 
 Public 
(n=22) 
Private 
(n=64) 
All 
(n=86) 
Abstract 16.68 15.31 15.66 
Effort 17.00 16.28 16.47 
Time 17.55 16.41 16.70 
All framings 17.08 16.00 16.28 
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TABLE 6: The effect of investment framing on the efficiency of decisions  
 
  Advantaged (n = 86) 
Disadvantaged 
(n = 86) 
baseline game 
Abstract vs. Effort 78.8% - 81.7% (p = 0.081) 
78.4% - 84.2% 
(p = 0.054) 
Abstract vs. Time 78.8% - 85.1% (p = 0.041) 
78.4% - 85.8% 
(p = 0.031) 
Effort vs. Time 81.7% - 85.1% (p = 0.136) 
84.2% - 85.8% 
(p = 0.648) 
specialization 
task 
Abstract vs. Effort 73.3% - 79.4%  (p = 0.059) 
78.3% - 81.7% 
 (p = 0.461) 
Abstract vs. Time 73.3% - 78.2%  (p = 0.060) 
78.3% - 83.5% 
 (p = 0.027) 
Effort vs. Time 79.4% - 78.2% (p = 0.383) 
81.7% - 83.5% 
(p = 0.096) 
In parentheses: p-values of the sign tests on two matched samples (two sided). 
Note that in the specialization game, for advantaged players, more efficiency means less contribution to 
the public good. 
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APPENDIX A: Instructions (translated from French) 
 
Welcome	  
	  
The	  study	  in	  which	  you	  are	  going	  to	  participate	  aims	  at	  studying	  economic	  behavior.	  	  More	  precisely,	  we	  
are	  interested	  in	  economic	  decisions	  in	  couples.	  
	  
During	  this	  study,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  respond	  to	  questions	  or	  to	  do	  simple	  tasks.	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  will	  give	  
you	  little	  by	  little	  instructions.	  These	  instructions	  are	  simple.	  If	  you	  pay	  attention,	  you	  can	  win	  a	  
significant	  amount	  of	  money.	  Your	  earnings	  will	  be	  paid	  out	  to	  you	  in	  cash	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  
	  
This	  study	  is	  financed	  by	  a	  public	  research	  funding	  agency.	  Please	  note	  that	  there	  are	  no	  right	  or	  wrong	  
answers	  for	  the	  questions	  we	  will	  pose	  you.	  We	  just	  wish	  to	  observe	  how	  you	  and	  your	  partner	  behave.	  
This	  study	  consists	  of	  multiple	  parts	  that	  have	  some	  differing	  “rules	  of	  the	  game”.	  In	  each	  part	  you	  will	  
be	  successively	  exposed	  to	  multiple	  situations.	  Each	  of	  them	  will	  be	  explained	  to	  you	  in	  detail,	  you	  will	  
then	  take	  a	  decision,	  answer	  a	  question	  or	  do	  a	  task.	  Each	  of	  your	  actions	  will	  allow	  you	  to	  earn	  Francs	  
Toulousains	   (FT	   for	   short).	   Your	   earnings	   in	   Francs	   Toulousain	   depend	   also	   on	   the	   decisions	   of	   your	  
partner,	  boy-­‐friend,	  girl-­‐friend,	  husband,	  wife,...	  From	  now	  on	  we	  will	  simply	  call	  him	  your	  ‘partner’.	  	  
	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study,	  one	  situation	  from	  each	  part	  will	  be	  randomly	  drawn	  by	  the	  computer	  for	  your	  
payout.	  
	  
Treatment	  “private”:	  
You	  will	  thus	  learn	  about	  your	  total	  earnings	  in	  FT	  for	  the	  whole	  study.	  
Treatment	  “public”:	  
You	  will	  thus	  learn	  for	  each	  situation	  that	  was	  randomly	  selected:	  your	  own	  earnings	  in	  FT	  as	  well	  as	  your	  
partners	  earnings	  and	  decisions.	  
	  
Your	  total	  earnings	  in	  FT	  will	  be	  converted	  to	  euros	  and	  paid	  out	  to	  you.	  The	  exchange	  rate	  between	  FT	  
and	  euros	  is:	  
	  
1	  euro	  for	  20	  FT	  
	  
We	   inform	   you	   that	   in	   this	   study	   the	   earning	   possibilities	   in	   the	  different	   situations	  will	   be	   either	   the	  
same	   for	   the	   man	   and	   the	   woman,	   or	   there	   will	   be	   an	   advantage	   for	   the	   	   [treatment	   	   “women	  
advantaged”	  :	  woman]	  [treatment	  “	  men	  advantaged”:	  man].	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Treatment	  “private”:	  
Please	   note	   that	   your	   decisions	   and	   thus	   your	   earnings	   are	   individual,	   private	   and	   anonymous.	   Your	  
earnings	  will	  be	  paid	  out	  to	  you	  individually,	   in	  secret,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  study.	  Specifically	  your	  partner	  
will	  have	  to	  possibility	  to	  find	  out	  about	  your	  decisions	  and	  your	  earnings.	  The	  same	  holds	  for	  any	  other	  
participant	  in	  this	  study.	  
	  
Your	  decisions	  and	  your	  earnings	  will	  be	  perfectly	  anonymous.	  To	  preserve	  your	  anonymity,	  a	  personal	  
identification	  number	  has	  been	  allocated	  to	  you:	  you	  find	  this	  number	  on	  the	  small	  piece	  of	  paper	  on	  your	  
table.	   The	   link	   between	   this	   number	   and	   your	   name	   will	   be	   used	   only	   once,	   in	   your	   presence,	   at	   the	  
moment	  of	  payout.	  In	  fact,	  you	  will	  have	  to	  present	  this	  number	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study	  to	  receive	  your	  
payment.	  We	  will	   thus	   have	   no	  means	   to	   later	   link	   the	   information	   collected	   during	   this	   study	  with	   a	  
name,	  since	  we	  will	  only	  keep	  your	  personal	  identification	  number	  in	  our	  files.	  You	  should	  thus	  feel	  free	  to	  
take	  any	  decision	  you	  want,	  without	  fear	  that	  it	  will	  be	  revealed	  to	  whoever,	  not	  even	  your	  partner.	  
	  
Treatment	  “public”:	  
Please	   note	   that	   the	   decisions	   taken	   by	   yourself	   and	   your	   partner	   are	   private	   and	   anonymous.	   Your	  
earnings,	  together	  with	  the	  earnings	  of	  your	  partner,	  will	  be	  paid	  out	  to	  you,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  study.	  The	  
other	  participants	  in	  this	  study	  will	  have	  no	  possibility	  to	  find	  out	  about	  your	  decisions	  and	  your	  earnings.	  	  
	  
Your	  decisions	  and	  your	  earnings	  will	  be	  perfectly	  anonymous.	  To	  preserve	  your	  anonymity,	  a	  personal	  
identification	  number	  has	  been	  allocated	  to	  you:	  you	  find	  this	  number	  on	  the	  small	  piece	  of	  paper	  on	  your	  
table.	   The	   link	   between	   this	   number	   and	   your	   name	   will	   be	   used	   only	   once,	   in	   your	   presence,	   at	   the	  
moment	  of	  payout.	  In	  fact,	  you	  will	  have	  to	  present	  this	  number	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study	  to	  receive	  your	  
payment.	  We	  will	   thus	   have	   no	  means	   to	   later	   link	   the	   information	   collected	   during	   this	   study	  with	   a	  
name,	  since	  we	  will	  only	  keep	  your	  personal	  identification	  number	  in	  our	  files.	  You	  should	  thus	  feel	  free	  to	  
take	  any	  decision	  you	  want,	  without	  fear	  that	  it	  will	  be	  revealed	  to	  whoever,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  your	  
partner.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  we	  placed	  on	  your	  tables	  a	  while	  sheet	  of	  paper.	  You	  can	  use	  it	  at	  any	  moment	  for	  notes.	  
We	  remind	  you	  that	  you	  are	  not	  allowed	  at	  any	  moment	  during	  the	  study.	   If	  you	  have	  a	  question	  or	   if	  
something	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  you,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand.	  
	  
We	  will	  now	  start	  with	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  study.	  We	  ask	  you	  to	  click	  on	  “next”	  if	  you	  have	  not	  already	  
done	  so.	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Part	  1	  
	  
	  
We	  will	  start	  the	  first	  part	  that	  will	  consist	  of	  two	  situations.	  Lets	  start	  with	  situation	  1.	  
	  
	  
Situation	  1	  
	  
In	   this	   first	   situation,	  we	  will	  allocate	   to	  each	  of	  you	  20	  tokens,	   thus	  40	  tokens	   for	  each	  couple.	  These	  
tokens	   can	  be	  used	   to	   earn	   some	   FT.	   For	   this	   you	  will	   have	   to	   take	   a	   simple	   and	   abstract	   investment	  
decision.	  You	  have	  the	  choice	  of	  investing	  your	  tokens,	  or	  part	  of	  them	  in	  an	  option	  A	  and/or	  in	  an	  option	  
B.	   Your	   earnings	   in	   FT	  will	   depend	  on	   your	   own	   investment	   decision	   but	   also	   on	   the	   decision	   of	   your	  
partner.	  
	  
The	  earnings	  generated	  by	  each	  option	  will	  be	  shown	  on	  your	  computer	  screen	  in	  a	  few	  minutes.	  
	  
You	  will	  have	  to	  take	  your	  decision,	  which	  means	  the	  number	  of	  tokens	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  option	  A	  and/or	  
in	  the	  option	  B,	  without	  communi	  cating	  with	  your	  partner.	  And	  thus	  without	  knowing	  what	  he	  or	  she	  
will	  choose.	  We	  will	  later	  ask	  you	  what	  you	  believe	  that	  your	  partner	  did.	  
	  
Treatment	  “private”:	  
For	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  privacy	  reasons,	  you	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  find	  our	  about	  the	  decisions	  of	  your	  
partner,	  not	  even	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  Equally,	  your	  partner	  will	  have	  no	  way	  to	  know	  your	  decision,	  
even	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  	  
Treatment	  “public”:	  
The	  decisions	  of	  your	  partner	  will	  be	  revealed	  to	  you	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  
	  
We	  remind	  you	  that	  we	  are	  here	  in	  the	  first	  situation	  of	  the	  first	  part,	  and	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study	  
one	  situation	  from	  each	  part	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  for	  your	  payment	  (that	  means	  that	  your	  earnings	  
in	  FT	  from	  that	  situation	  will	  be	  converted	  to	  euros).	  Each	  of	  your	  decisions	  is	  thus	  important	  since	  it	  can	  
be	  selected	  for	  payment.	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You	  will	  now	  see	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  instructions	  and	  of	  the	  earnings	  of	  each	  option	  on	  your	  screen.	  We	  
will	  now	  distribute	  a	  sheet	  with	  an	  understanding	  question.	  Please	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  	  with	  respect	  
to	  this	  first	  situation.	  Take	  your	  time	  to	  respond.	  Do	  not	  hesitate	  to	  ask	  questions.	  Please	  wait	  for	  us	  to	  
pass	  at	  your	  table	  before	  clicking	  on	  the	  button	  ‘”next”.	  
	  
Summary	  on	  screen:	  
You	  and	  your	  partner	  have	  each	  20	  tokens.	  
	  
You	  and	  your	  	  partner	  can	  invest	  the	  number	  of	  tokens	  you	  want	  in	  an	  option	  A	  and/or	  an	  option	  B.	  
	  
Each	  token	  invested	  by	  yourself	  in	  the	  option	  A	  generates	  for	  you	  10	  FT.	  
Each	  token	  invested	  by	  your	  partner	  in	  the	  option	  A	  generates	  for	  him/her	  10	  FT.	  
	  
Each	  token	  invested	  in	  the	  option	  B	  generates	  for	  you	  6	  FT	  and	  generates	  6	  FT	  for	  your	  partner.	  
Each	  token	  invested	  by	  your	  partner	  in	  the	  option	  B	  generates	  for	  you	  6	  FT	  and	  generates	  6	  FT	  for	  your	  
partner.	  
	  
Decision	  screen	  (for	  detailed	  layout	  see	  Appendix	  B):	  
option	  A:	  ___	  
option	  B:	  ___	  
	  
Questionnaire	  screen	  after	  decision:	  
What	  do	  you	  think:	  how	  much	  has	  your	  partner	  put	  in:	  
	  
option	  A:	  ___	  
option	  B:	  ___	  
	  
(10	  FT	  for	  each	  correct	  answer,	  plus/minus	  2	  tokens)	  
	  
Situation	  2	  
	  
We	  will	  now	  start	  the	  second	  situation	  of	  the	  first	  part.	  This	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  preceding	  one.	  You	  
will	  have	  again	  20	  tokens	  each,	  that	  means	  40	  tokens	  per	  couple.	  But	  the	  earnings	  associated	  with	  the	  
investment	  decision	  A	  are	  now	  more	  advantageous	  for	  the	  [treatment	  	  “women	  advantaged”	  :	  women]	  
39	  
	  
[treatment	   “	   men	   advantaged”:	   men].	   Those	   associated	   with	   the	   investment	   decision	   B	   have	   not	  
changed.	  The	  details	  of	  the	  earnings	  from	  each	  option	  will	  be	  shown	  on	  your	  screen	  in	  a	  moment.	  
	  
We	  remind	  you	  that	  we	  are	  here	  in	  the	  second	  situation	  of	  the	  first	  part,	  and	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study	  
one	  situation	  from	  this	  part	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  for	  final	  payment.	  
	  
Treatment	  “private”:	  
We	  also	  remind	  you	  that	  you	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  find	  out	  about	  the	  decision	  of	  your	  partner,	  not	  even	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  	  
	  
The	  details	  concerning	  the	  earnings	  from	  each	  option	  appear	  now	  on	  your	  screen.	  Please	  respond	  to	  the	  
understanding	  questions	  concerning	  the	  second	  situation	  on	  the	  sheet	  that	  we	  distributed	  to	  you.	  Please	  
wait	  that	  we	  pass	  by	  your	  place	  before	  clicking	  on	  “next”.	  
	  	  
	  
Summary	  on	  screen:	  
You	  and	  your	  partner	  have	  each	  20	  tokens.	  
	  
You	  and	  your	  	  partner	  can	  invest	  the	  number	  of	  tokens	  you	  want	  in	  an	  option	  A	  and/or	  an	  option	  B.	  
	  
If	  you	  are	  a	  man	  (dependent	  on	  treatment:	  woman):	  
Each	  token	  invested	  in	  the	  option	  A	  generates	  for	  you	  13	  FT.	  
If	  you	  are	  a	  woman	  (dependent	  on	  treatment:	  man):	  
Each	  token	  invested	  in	  the	  option	  A	  generates	  for	  you	  10	  FT.	  
	  
Whether	   you	   are	   man	   or	   woman,	   each	   token	   invested	   in	   the	   option	   B	   generates	   for	   you	   6	   FT	   and	  
generates	  6	  FT	  for	  your	  partner.	  
	  
Decision	  screen	  (for	  detailed	  layout	  see	  Appendix	  B):	  
option	  A:	  ___	  
option	  B:	  ___	  
Questionnaire	  screen	  after	  decision:	  
What	  do	  you	  think:	  how	  much	  has	  your	  partner	  put	  in:	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option	  A:	  ___	  
option	  B:	  ___	  
	  
(10	  FT	  for	  each	  correct	  answer,	  plus/minus	  2	  tokens)	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Part	  2	  
	  
We	  start	  the	  second	  part	  that	  will	  also	  consist	  of	  two	  situations.	  However	  there	  will	  be	  no	  more	  tokens.	  
From	  now	  on,	  we	  will	  give	  you	  the	  opportunity	  to	  work	  to	  gain	  FT.	  This	  “work”	  is	  simple	  and	  abstract.	  
	  
We	  start	  with	  the	  first	  situation.	  
	  
Situation	  1	  
	  
You	   and	   your	   partner	   will	   have	   the	   possibility	   to	   work	   on	   two	   identical	   tasks	   that	   however	   generate	  
different	  earnings:	  task	  A	  and	  task	  B.	  You	  will	  each	  have	  5	  minutes	  time	  and	  will	  be	  paid	  in	  proportion	  to	  
the	  time	  that	  you	  will	  spend	  on	  either	  task.	  
	  
Concretely	  the	  work	  will	  consist	  in	  typing	  phone	  numbers	  that	  will	  be	  shown	  on	  your	  screen.	  The	  gains	  
from	  each	  task	  are	  the	  following:	  
	   If	  you	  work	  on	  task	  A,	  you	  earn	  40	  FT	  per	  minute.	  
If	   you	   work	   on	   task	   B,	   you	   earn	   24	   FT	   per	  minute	   and	   your	   partner	   will	   also	   earn	   24	   FT	   per	  
minute.	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We	  remind	  you	  that	  you	  will	  be	  paid	  based	  on	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  time	  that	  you	  will	  spend	  on	  each	  task	  
during	  these	  5	  minutes	  and	  not	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  phone	  numbers	  that	  you	  type.	  
	  
You	   also	   have	   the	   possibility	   to	   distract	   yourself,	  which	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   any	   earnings	   in	   FT.	  On	   your	  
screen	  you	  have	  several	  entertainment	  activities	  at	  your	  disposition.	  For	  example	  games,	  journals	  and	  a	  
web	  browser.	  We	  inform	  you	  that	  you	  can	  not	  use	  the	  web	  browser	  for	  communication.	  
	  
Your	  partner	  is	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  situation	  as	  you	  and	  can	  work	  on	  the	  tasks	  A,	  B	  or	  distract	  himself.	  
	  
We	  will	   now	   distribute	   a	   short	   summary	   of	   these	   instructions,	  with	   a	   understanding	   question.	   Please	  
take	  your	  time	  to	  read	  these	  and	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  question.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐	  
	  
To	   summarize,	   you	   and	   your	   partner	  will	   have	   the	   possibility	   to	  work	   leading	   to	   payment	   or	   to	   use	   a	  
distraction.	  Note	  that	  you	  will	  be	  in	  fact	  paid	  by	  rounded	  intervals	  of	  15	  seconds.	  If	  you	  work	  for	  example	  
for	   8	   seconds	   or	  more	   on	   a	   task,	  we	  will	   consider	   that	   you	  worked	   for	   15	   seconds.	   If	   you	  work	   for	   7	  
seconds	  or	  less	  on	  a	  task	  we	  will	  consider	  that	  you	  did	  not	  work.	  
	  
You	  will	  have	  to	  act	  without	  communicating	  with	  your	  partner,	  and	  thus	  without	  knowing	  what	  he	  or	  she	  
will	  choose.	  We	  will	  afterwards	  ask	  you	  what	  you	  think	  that	  your	  partner	  did	  in	  this	  situation.	  
	  
Treatment	  “private”:	  
For	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  privacy	  reasons,	  you	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  find	  our	  about	  the	  decisions	  of	  your	  
partner,	  not	  even	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  Equally,	  your	  partner	  will	  have	  no	  way	  to	  know	  your	  decision,	  
even	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  	  
Treatment	  “public”:	  
The	  decisions	  of	  your	  partner	  will	  be	  revealed	  to	  you	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  
	  
You	  will	  now	  have	  a	  few	  minutes	  to	  familiarize	  yourself	  with	  the	  different	  tasks:	  task	  A,	  task	  B	  and	  the	  
distraction	   task.	  This	   test	  period	  will	  not	   lead	   to	  earnings.	  Click	  on	   the	  different	  buttons	  on	   the	   left	   to	  
explore	  each	  of	   the	  options:	   try	   to	  type	  some	  numers,	   look	  at	   the	  different	  distraction	  options.	  Notice	  
that	  you	  can	  switch	  at	  any	  moment	  between	  the	  different	  options	  and	  come	  back	  to	  the	  same	  multiple	  
times.	  
	  
Before	  this	  test	  period	  a	  screen	  with	  a	  summary	  of	  these	  instructions	  will	  appear	  on	  your	  screen.	  Look	  at	  
these	  instructions	  by	  clicking	  on	  “next”	  to	  start	  the	  test	  period.	  
43	  
	  
	  
Summary	  on	  screen:	  
You	   have	   5	  minutes.	   You	   can	  work	   on	   task	   A,	   on	   task	   B	   or	   use	   the	   distraction	   task.	   You	  will	   be	   paid	  
proportionally	   to	   the	   time	   that	   you	  will	   spend	   on	   each	   of	   the	   two	   tasks.	   Your	   partner	   is	   in	   the	   same	  
situation	  as	  you.	  
	  
Working	  on	  task	  A	  generates	  for	  you	  40	  FT	  per	  minute.	  
Working	  on	  task	  B	  generates	  for	  you	  24	  FT	  per	  minute	  and	  generates	  24	  FT	  per	  minute	  for	  your	  partner.	  
	  
Decision	  screen	  (for	  detailed	  layout	  see	  Appendix	  B):	  
task	  A:	  	  
task	  B:	  	  
distraction	  task:	  
Questionnaire	  screen	  after	  decision:	  
What	  do	  you	  think:	  how	  much	  time	  did	  your	  partner	  spend	  on:	  
	  
task	  A:	  ___	  
task	  B:	  ___	  
distraction	  task:	  ___	  
	  
(10	  FT	  for	  each	  correct	  answer,	  plus/minus	  20	  seconds)	  
	  
Situation	  2	  
	  
The	  second	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  previous.	  You	  have	  again	  5	  minutes	  time	  to	  work	  on	  task	  A,	  B	  or	  to	  
use	  the	  distraction.	  Careful:	  the	  earnings	  in	  FT	  generated	  by	  task	  A	  are	  now	  more	  advantageous	  for	  the	  
[treatment	  	  “women	  advantaged”	  :	  women]	  [treatment	  “	  men	  advantaged”:	  men].	  Those	  associated	  with	  
task	  B	  have	  not	  changed.	  The	  details	  of	  the	  earnings	  from	  each	  option	  will	  be	  shown	  on	  your	  screen	  in	  a	  
moment.	  
	  
The	  distraction	  task	  does	  not	  generate	  any	  earnings.	  
	  
We	  remind	  you	  that	  we	  are	  here	  in	  the	  second	  situation	  of	  the	  second	  part,	  and	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
study	  one	  situation	  from	  this	  part	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  for	  final	  payment.	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Treatment	  “private”:	  
We	  also	  remind	  you	  that	  you	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  find	  out	  about	  the	  decision	  of	  your	  partner,	  not	  even	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  	  
	  
The	  details	  concerning	  the	  earnings	  from	  each	  option	  appear	  now	  on	  your	  screen.	  When	  you	  are	  ready	  
click	  on	  “next”	  to	  start.	  
	  
Summary	  on	  screen:	  
The	  situation	  is	  the	  same	  as	  previously.	  You	  have	  5	  minutes	  but	  the	  earnings	  changed.	  	  
	  
If	  you	  are	  a	  man	  (dependent	  on	  treatment:	  woman):	  
Working	  on	  task	  A	  generates	  for	  you	  52	  FT	  per	  minute.	  
If	  you	  are	  a	  woman	  (dependent	  on	  treatment:	  man):	  
Working	  on	  task	  A	  generates	  for	  you	  40	  FT	  per	  minute.	  
	  
Whether	  you	  are	  man	  or	  woman,	  working	  on	  task	  B	  generates	  for	  you	  24	  FT	  per	  minute	  and	  generates	  
24	  FT	  per	  minute	  for	  your	  partner.	  
	  
Decision	  screen	  (for	  detailed	  layout	  see	  Appendix	  B):	  
task	  A:	  	  
task	  B:	  	  
distraction	  task:	  
Questionnaire	  screen	  after	  decision:	  
What	  do	  you	  think:	  how	  much	  time	  did	  your	  partner	  spend	  on:	  
	  
task	  A:	  ___	  
task	  B:	  ___	  
distraction	  task:	  ___	  
	  
(10	  FT	  for	  each	  correct	  answer,	  plus/minus	  20	  seconds)	  
	  
Part	  3	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We	   start	   the	   third	   part	   that	   will	   also	   consist	   of	   two	   situations.	   This	   part	   will	   be	   very	   similar	   to	   the	  
previous,	   however	   you	   will	   no	   longer	   have	   the	   possibility	   to	   use	   the	   distraction	   task.	   You	   and	   your	  
partner	  have	  each	  5	  minutes	   and	   you	  will	   be	  paid	  proportional	   to	   the	   total	   time	   you	   spend	  on	  either	  
task.	  
	  
We	  start	  with	  the	  first	  situation.	  
	  
Situation	  1	  
	  
The	  gains	  from	  each	  task	  are	  the	  following:	  
	   If	  you	  work	  on	  task	  A,	  you	  earn	  40	  FT	  per	  minute.	  
If	   you	   work	   on	   task	   B,	   you	   earn	   24	   FT	   per	  minute	   and	   your	   partner	   will	   also	   earn	   24	   FT	   per	  
minute.	  	  
	  
We	  remind	  you	  that	  we	  are	  here	  in	  the	  first	  situation	  of	  the	  third	  part,	  and	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study	  
one	  situation	  from	  this	  part	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  for	  final	  payment.	  
	  
Treatment	  “private”:	  
We	  also	  remind	  you	  that	  you	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  find	  out	  about	  the	  decision	  of	  your	  partner,	  not	  even	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  	  
	  
The	  details	  concerning	  the	  earnings	  from	  each	  option	  appear	  now	  on	  your	  screen.	  When	  you	  are	  ready	  
click	  on	  “next”	  to	  start.	  
	  
Summary	  on	  screen:	  
You	  have	  5	  minutes.	  You	  can	  work	  on	  task	  A	  or	  on	  task	  B.	  You	  will	  be	  paid	  proportionally	  to	  the	  time	  that	  
you	  will	  spend	  on	  each	  of	  the	  two	  tasks.	  Your	  partner	  is	  in	  the	  same	  situation	  as	  you.	  
	  
Working	  on	  task	  A	  generates	  for	  you	  40	  FT	  per	  minute.	  
Working	  on	  task	  B	  generates	  for	  you	  24	  FT	  per	  minute	  and	  generates	  24	  FT	  per	  minute	  for	  your	  partner.	  
	  
Decision	  screen	  (for	  detailed	  layout	  see	  Appendix	  B):	  
task	  A:	  	  
task	  B:	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Questionnaire	  screen	  after	  decision:	  
What	  do	  you	  think:	  how	  much	  time	  did	  your	  partner	  spend	  on:	  
	  
task	  A:	  ___	  
task	  B:	  ___	  
	  
(10	  FT	  for	  each	  correct	  answer,	  plus/minus	  20	  seconds)	  
	  
Situation	  2	  
	  
The	   second	   situation	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  previous.	   The	  earnings	   in	   FT	   generated	  by	   task	  A	  are	  now	  more	  
advantageous	  for	  the	  [treatment	  	  “women	  advantaged”	  :	  women]	  [treatment	  “	  men	  advantaged”:	  men].	  
Those	  associated	  with	  task	  B	  have	  not	  changed.	  	  
	  
The	  details	  concerning	  the	  earnings	  from	  each	  option	  appear	  now	  on	  your	  screen.	  When	  you	  are	  ready	  
click	  on	  “next”	  to	  start.	  
	  
Summary	  on	  screen:	  
The	  situation	  is	  the	  same	  as	  previously.	  You	  have	  5	  minutes	  but	  the	  earnings	  changed.	  	  
	  
If	  you	  are	  a	  man	  (dependent	  on	  treatment:	  woman):	  
Working	  on	  task	  A	  generates	  for	  you	  52	  FT	  per	  minute.	  
	  
If	  you	  are	  a	  woman	  (dependent	  on	  treatment:	  man):	  
Working	  on	  task	  A	  generates	  for	  you	  40	  FT	  per	  minute.	  
	  
	  
Whether	  you	  are	  man	  or	  woman,	  working	  on	  task	  B	  generates	  for	  you	  24	  FT	  per	  minute	  and	  generates	  
24	  FT	  per	  minute	  for	  your	  partner.	  
	  
	  
Decision	  screen	  (for	  detailed	  layout	  see	  Appendix	  B):	  
task	  A:	  	  
task	  B:	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Questionnaire	  screen	  after	  decision:	  
What	  do	  you	  think:	  how	  much	  time	  did	  your	  partner	  spend	  on:	  
	  
task	  A:	  ___	  
task	  B:	  ___	  
	  
(10	  FT	  for	  each	  correct	  answer,	  plus/minus	  20	  seconds)	  
	  
	  
Part	  4	  
	  
We	  now	  start	  the	  4th	  part	  in	  which	  you	  will	  no	  longer	  have	  to	  work.	  You	  will	  simply	  have	  to	  take	  a	  series	  
of	  decisions.	  
	  
The	  instructions	  will	  appear	  on	  the	  screen.	  I	  will	  read	  them	  out	  loud.	  Please	  read	  them	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
and	  not	  to	  click	  on	  “next”	  immediately.	  
	  
You	  will	  take	  a	  series	  of	  decisions.	  
	  
Each	  numbered	  line,	  proposes	  two	  possible	  divisions	  of	  FT	  between	  you	  and	  your	  partner.	  
For	  each	  line,	  you	  have	  to	  choose	  one	  of	  the	  two	  divisions:	  the	  option	  A	  or	  the	  option	  B.	  
	  
Take	  for	  example	  the	  first	  line.	  In	  option	  A,	  both	  partners	  earns	  100	  FT.	  In	  option	  B,	  you	  earn	  300	  FT	  for	  
yourself	  and	  your	  partner	  earns	  0	  FT.	  
	  
For	  each	   line,	  you	  will	   thus	  have	  to	  check	  one	  of	  the	  boxes.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study,	  we	  will	   randomly	  
select	   on	   of	   the	   line	   for	   final	   payment.	  We	  will	   then	   randomly	   select	  which	   of	   the	   two	  decisions	   in	   a	  
couple	  (the	  division	  chosen	  by	  the	  man	  or	  by	  the	  woman)	  will	  be	  applied.	  
	  
Please	  take	  now	  your	  decision.	  Please	  do	  not	  hesitate	  to	  ask	  us	  questions.	  
	  
	  
Part	  5	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The	   computer	  will	   now	  make	   the	   random	   draws	   concerning	   each	   part	   of	   the	   study	   to	   calculate	   your	  
individual	  earnings.	  
	  
Treatment	  “private”:	  
Your	  individual	  earnings	  will	  appear	  on	  the	  screen.	  
Treatment	  “public”:	  
The	  earnings	  will	  appear	  on	  the	  screen.	  You	  have	  a	  few	  minutes	  to	  look	  at	  them.	  Please	  do	  not	  click	  on	  
“next”	  immediately.	  
	  
	  
Treatment	  “private”:	  
You	  now	  know	  your	  individual	  earnings.	  Your	  partner	  will	  not	  be	  informed	  about	  them.	  
Treatment	  “public”:	  
You	  now	  know	  your	  individual	  earnings	  and	  the	  individual	  earnings	  of	  your	  partner.	  
	  
	  
	  
Your	  earnings	  are	  individual:	  you	  will	  receive	  your	  earnings	  separately	   in	   individual	  envelops.	  However,	  
you	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  decide	  to	  transfer	  your	  individual	  earnings	  or	  part	  of	  them	  to	  a	  joint	  envelope	  
that	  is	  given	  to	  the	  couple.	  We	  call	  this	  the	  “common	  account”.	  
	  
You	  can	  now	  discuss	  with	  your	  partner	  the	  contributions	  of	  each	  to	  this	  common	  account.	  
	  
To	   do	   so	   you	   have	   access	   to	   a	   “chat”	   tool.	   Concretely	   you	   can	   write	  messages	   for	   your	   partner	   in	   a	  
window	   on	   your	   screen.	   He	   or	   she	   can	   then	   respond	   to	   you	   with	   the	   same	   tool.	   Each	   of	   you	   can,	  
whenever	  he	  wants,	  fill	  in	  the	  amount	  that	  he	  	  or	  she	  wishes	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  common	  account.	  
	  
When	   you	   want,	   you	   fill	   in	   the	   amount	   that	   you	   want	   to	   transfer	   to	   the	   common	   account	   and	   your	  
partner	  will	  do	  the	  same.	  We	  will	  then	  ask	  you	  if	  you	  agree	  with	  the	  proposal	  by	  your	  partner.	  The	  chat	  
phase	  will	  continue	  until	  you	  agree	  on	  the	  amount	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  common	  account.	  
	  
All	  of	  this	  is	  summarized	  on	  the	  following	  screen.	  Click	  on	  “next”	  to	  access	  the	  chat.	  
	  
End	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The	  study	  is	  now	  finished.	  
	  
We	  now	  ask	  you	  fill	  out	  this	  final	  questionnaire	  that	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  have	  more	  information	  about	  you.	  
These	  information	  are	  very	  important	  for	  the	  scientific	  quality	  of	  the	  study.	  If	  certain	  questions	  seem	  too	  
indiscreet,	  we	  prefer	   that	   you	  do	  not	   respond	   to	   them	   than	   to	   respond	   falsely.	  However	   rest	   assured	  
that	  your	  responses	  stay	  completely	  anonymous	  and	  private.	  Even	  your	  partner	  will	  not	  be	  informed	  of	  
them.	  You	  will	  receive	  100	  FT	  for	  taking	  the	  time	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  questionnaire.	  
	  
When	  you	  are	   finished	  with	   the	  questionnaire,	   you	   can	   return	   to	   the	   reception	   room	   to	  wait	   for	   final	  
payout.	  Make	  sure	  to	  keep	  your	  personal	  identification	  number	  with	  you.	  
	  
We	  will	  call	  you	  one	  by	  one	  to	  give	  you	  your	  payment	  and	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  sign	  a	  receipt.	  If	  you	  wish	  you	  
can	  stay	  after	  payout	  to	  lean	  more	  about	  this	  research	  project	  and	  the	  questions	  we	  want	  to	  investigate	  
in	  this	  study.	  
	  
Thank	  you	  very	  much	  for	  your	  participation.	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APPENDIX B: Decision screens 
 
 
  
  
Specialization	  task:	  Abstract	  treatment	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Specialization	  task:	  Effort	  treatment	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Specialization	  task:	  Time	  treatment	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Payout screen in treatment: public 
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Chat	  screen	  in	  treatment	  public	  (male	  version)	  
	  
 
